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Abstract
This paper investigates legislation in parliamentary and semi-presidential democ-
racies where the legislature and the president have formal role in legislation. A
proposed law is rst voted in the legislature and if it passes, comes to the consider-
ation of the president. I study two prevalent legislative procedures: (i) Single-round
legislation where the presidents action is nal, (ii) Two-round legislation the presi-
dents approval enacts the law but after his veto proposal returns to the legislature
for rediscussion. In this setup I examine power balance and the e¢ ciency of infor-
mation aggregation. For this I build a model of strategic voting with incomplete
information and analyze di¤erent ideological proles of the president and the ho-
mogenous legislature. The president seems powerless in two-round legislation but in
equilibrium there are instances he can change the legislation result. Power struggle
arises only when the legislature is modernist and the president is conservative. If the
legislature is conservative and the president is modernist, the president has no im-
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pact on the outcome, but adversely a¤ects informational e¢ ciency. If they have the
same ideological bias, the presidential institution is benecial and the presidents
existence provides full information aggregation with nite legislature size in single-
round legislation. Above results can be generalized to heterogeneous legislature with
two types, except full information aggregation is never achieved.
JEL Numbers: D72, D78
Key words: Voting, Information aggregation e¢ ciency, Ideological bias, Power,
Unicameral, Parliamentary, Semi-presidential, Democracy
1 Introduction
Modern representative democracies have di¤erent forms. Based on government
formation and law-making, democratic systems can be categorized as presiden-
tial, semi-presidential and parliamentary democracies. Examples are United
States, Brazil and S. Korea for presidential democracy and France, Portugal,
Poland, Russia for semi-presidential democracy. Most European countries such
as Germany, Spain, UK, Sweden and Turkey adopted parliamentary democ-
racy. In addition representative democracies are also classied according to
the composition of the legislature. Unicameral legislature is unitary and has
only one house while bicameral legislature has two separate houses.
In a presidential democracy, the legislative or a committee initiates a law and
then the legislative votes on the proposed bill to enact it. In a parliamentary
democracy however the executive initiates a law and then the legislative i.e.
the parliament votes on it. If the legislature does not approve the proposed
law, then the process ends. If the legislature approves the proposed law then
it comes to the consideration of the president. If the president also approves
2
then the law is enacted. However if the president vetoes, then depending on the
constitution of the state either the law is abolished or the proposed law returns
to the legislative for rediscussion. In the latter situation, if the legislative
endorses the law again, then the law is enacted as the president does not have
a second veto right. Legislation in semi-presidential democracies is similar to
parliamentary democracies but the president in a semi-presidential system has
more formal power and he can abolish the proposed law in the rst place and
even dismiss the executive.
Thus law making procedure di¤ers in representative democracies. The process
of voting in juries, committees and legislatures and information aggregation
properties have been studied in the literature starting from the seminal con-
tributions of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). However the existing models
of unicameral or bicameral legislatures implicitly assume that the legislature
is itself decisive in enacting a law and thus do not take into account the role
of the president. Then the starting point of this paper is to examine vot-
ing and legislation in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies with
considering the role of the president. To simplify analysis and get indicative
results, I restrict attention to unicameral legislature. I study the two alterna-
tive legislative processes mentioned earlier: The veto of the president abolishes
the proposed law or the veto of the president sends the proposal back to the
legislature for voting second time.
In this setup one imminent question is how ideological prole of the legis-
lature and the president a¤ect voting or vetoing strategies. In particular do
legislative members and the president act informatively (i.e. according to their
own perception regarding the merits of the proposed law) or do they vote ac-
cording to their ideological bias. Another aspect of this problem, as commonly
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stressed in the literature, is the e¢ ciency of the information aggregation. Does
the existence of the president improve legislation and likelihood of correctly
enacting benecial laws or abolishing incompetent laws? And if so, how much.
One can even question the necessity of the existence of the president. In light
of Condercet Jury Theorem if ensembles aggregate information better, why do
democracies need the institution of the president? It may further be the case
that assigning one person to an inuential role after the legislature harms the
correct decision making. A possible defense is to have a power balance and
to prevent the legislative from being dictatorial. This is satisfactory when the
action of the president determines the fate of the proposal but the president
seems to be powerless in two round process since the legislature can always
approve the law in the second round and enact it. In this respect I investigate
whether the presidents action make an impact or signal some information to
the legislature in order to assess whether the president is really powerless in
two round legislation.
To answer these questions I establish a model of strategic voting with the legis-
lature and the president. Members of the legislature and the president receive
a private and imperfect signal about the quality of the proposed bill. Each
member of the legislature and the president have publicly known ideological
orientation. In particular an actor can be either conservative who favors status
quo, or modernist who favors new proposals.
How do the president and the legislature cast their votes? I call an actor votes
informatively if he always follows his signal and cast the associated vote. I de-
ne full information aggregation equivalence when the probability of making
correct decision in the actual game is be the same of the game played as if all
information publicly known. Before solving the model, I rst review the setting
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in Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) where the unicameral homogenous legisla-
ture is deciding on its own without the president. I characterize the equilibria
of single round and two round voting. Full information aggregation is achieved
for a wider range of aggregation rule in two round voting compared to single
round voting. Introducing a president that has the same ideology with the
legislature provides full information aggregation in single round voting for a
range of aggregation rules. Next I consider di¤erent ideological composition
of the legislature and the president. When conservatives are more powerful
in the legislature, i.e. they are a blocking coalition and the president is mod-
ernist, then the president does not have any role in the process. (e¤ect on
the outcome.) The legislative is basically deciding on its own. More interest-
ing case is when modernists are dominant in the legislature and the president
is conservative. In single round legislation there is a power struggle between
the legislature and the president which decreases the e¢ ciency of information
aggregation. In two round legislation however the legislature becomes more
powerful. Because power struggle is diminished signicantly, the existence of
the president does not have a negative impact on information aggregation
and even his signal marginally improves (contributes towards) information
e¢ ciency. Here there are instances in which the president does not have an
impact on the outcome but there are also instances in which he can change the
outcome. Thus the president is not totally powerless in two round legislation.
Section 2 explains the relevant literature. In section 3, I describe the formal
model and I perform a preliminary analysis in section 4. Section 5 characterizes
equilibria of the model and provides main results of the article. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Related Literature
This work contributes to two lines of research that develops after Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). There is a
literature that studies two class voting which investigates decision making
with two committees. Specically, Maug and Yilmaz (2001) analyze the situ-
ation where two groups, seniors and juniors, inside the committee are voting
simultaneously. More recently, Iaryzower (2008) studies voting between two
sequential committees. He examines information transmission between com-
mittees and nds conditions for informative voting. Single round version of
my legislation model (with unicameral legislature and the president) can be
thought of a special case of sequential voting in which the receiving committee
consists of a single person, the president but as I show, types of equilibria and
the results are di¤erent. Moreover Iaryzower (2008) does not consider the case
of two round legislation where the bill returns to the originating committee.
Hence the setting here (in my research) is more suitable for examining par-
liamentary and semi-presidential democracies with (and there is) a focus on
e¢ ciency of information aggregation, power distribution and the role of the
president. (between the legislature and the president.)
This research is also related to the literature on standard pivotal and signal
pivotal voting motivations. Razin (2003) investigates signal pivotal voting in
one round election and the winner implements his policy after the election. In
Piketty (2000) voting takes place in two stages and the same electorate chooses
between the previous policy and the alternative. Then Meirowitz and Shhotts
(2009) consider pivotal and signaling motives in two period elections but the
analysis is the information transmitted by voters and its e¤ect on candidates
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positions in the second election. winning policy competes with another in the
next round.
3 The Model
A proposed law is going to be accepted or rejected. If it is accepted (A) then
it replaces the status quo otherwise the status quo (Q) remains. There is a
unicameral legislature consisting of N members and the president. First the
proposed law is voted in the legislature without abstention. The proposal
passes the legislature if it receives R number of votes or more. R is an integer
and identies the aggregation rule. If the legislature does not pass the proposed
law, the law is abolished and the process ends without any further action
of the president. If the legislature passes the proposed law, then legislation
continues with the president. The approval of the president will enact the law
and end the legislation. In the case of the presidents veto, as indicated in
the constitution of the state, either the proposed law is rejected or it returns
to the legislature for voting. I call former procedure 1-round voting and the
latter 2-round voting. In 2-round voting, if the legislature does not pass the
law in the second round, then the law is rejected and the status quo remains.
However if the proposed law passes the legislature again by receiving at least
R votes, then the president has to pass the law and the law will be enacted.
There are two possible states of the world: The proposed law is benecial (A)
or not (Q). The true state of nature w is unknown. Members of the legislature
and the president share a common prior belief that the true state is Q with
probability . In addition, each player receives an imperfect, private signal
regarding the merits of the proposed law. The accuracy of the signal is q >
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1/2 for all players and is independent of the state of the world. Because the
environment is stochastic, given an information set I, an individual considers
utility loss uA;Q < 0 from type 1 error (passing poor law) and utility loss
uQ;A < 0 from type 2 error (blocking a benecial law). Normalizing utility loss
from making correct decision to zero, a player prefers outcome Q if Prfw =
AjIg:uQ;A > Prfw = QjIg:uA;Q Equivalently the player prefers status quo if
Prfw = QjIg >  and prefers proposal to be implemented if Prfw = QjIg
< ; where  = uQ;A=(uQ;A+ uA;Q).  2 (0; 1) is called threshold of reasonable
doubt.
Both the members of the legislature and the president share a common ob-
jective in that they want to approve the law if it is benecial and reject if
it is poor. However they di¤er with respect to their threshold of reasonable
doubt, . In particular an individual can be of two type: Conservative who
prefers status quo unless convinced enough for the merits of the proposed law,
or a modernist who favors reforms unless really convinced that the status quo
should be kept. Thus threshold of reasonable doubt of a conservative (c) is
less than threshold of reasonable doubt of a modernist (m). The ideological
biases of all players are common knowledge.
I assume Prfw = Qji = Ag > c and Prfw = Qji = Qg < m: These
conditions ensure that an individuals private signal, by itself, cannot overturn
his preference against his bias and the individual seeks further evidence in
addition to his own information to decide against his bias.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in symmetric, weakly
undominated strategies. Although McLennan (2001) illustrates asymmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium that yields superior informational e¢ ciency prop-
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erties, this class of equilibrium requires coordination among players 1 . There-
fore I commit to symmetric mixed strategy equilibria.
The criterion for e¢ ciency is full information aggregation, that is an equilib-
rium is e¢ cient if probability of correct decisionis the same as if all signals
were common knowledge.
The above game admits multiple equilibria that vary in the degree of players
informative action 2 . To analyze e¢ ciency and information aggregation, I re-
strict attention to the most informative equilibria: The equilibria that yield
both ex-ante greater probability of correct decision (matching true state) and
lower probability of false decision in the Pareto sense inside all equilibria.
3.1 Standard and Signal Pivotal Motivations
In this setup a legislature member is guided by both standard-pivotal and
signal-pivotal motivations while casting his vote. In single-round voting the
member considers in the rst step whether the proposed law will pass the
legislature or not. So he should condition on the case he is just pivotal on the
proposal being approved or abolished in the legislature. This is the standard-
pivotal motive. At the same time he would also consider the e¤ect of his vote on
1 (2009) shows that asymmetric mixed strategies can be implemented in an in-
nitely repeated game without coordination. However the game in my model proceed
at most two round and voters condition on rst round outcome. Thus coordination
is still required to realize asymmetric equilibrium.
2 For instance if the legislature is homogenous there always exists an equilibrium
where legislature members all unconditionally vote A or all unconditionally vote Q.
However I eliminate such equilibria and other less informative equilibria.
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the presidents approve or veto action (through the information transmitted by
the tally). This is the signal-pivotal motive and I call (designate) a legislature
member signal-pivotal when his vote just changes the action of the president.
In two-round legislation, similarly a legislature member has both standard-
pivotal and signal-pivotal motivates as in single-round voting. But now the
signaling phenomenon (motive) is more sophisticated. The member considers
being signal-pivotal on the nal result through sending information to the
president and/or to other legislature members for second round. During second
round voting, members think of only being standard pivotal.
4 Preliminary Analysis
Before solving the actual model, it is useful to look at an analogous problem
to Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). Consider a single round legislation in
which all the members of the legislature have the same ideological bias 
and there is no president. That is the legislature is homogenous and deciding
autonomously. To nd the equilibrium, think about the voting decision of an
individual. The only situation in which the vote of a legislature member e¤ects
the outcome is the tally of votes (number of approval votes) t i except him is
exactlyR 1. Therefore while casting vote, a member conditions on the case he
is pivotal, i.e. the tally of votes except him is exactly R-1. I dene informative
voting as the pure strategy that votes Q when having Q signal and votes A
when having A signal. The information set of a voter while casting a vote is
his private signal i and the fact that he is pivotal. Let PQ(R) and PA(R)
denote the likelihood of true state being Q condition on the information set
with Q and A signals, respectively: PQ(R) = Prfw = Qjt i = R   1; i = Qg
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and PA(R) = Prfw = Qjt i = R   1; i = Ag: Then member i will vote
informatively if PA(R) <  < PQ(R): Let KN be the set of aggregation rules
that satisfy this condition, KN = fR : PA(R) <  < PQ(R)g:
Proposition 1 (Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)) In single round vot-
ing, legislature members vote informatively if and only if R 2 KN : If R > k;
then in equilibrium PA(R) <  = PQ(R): If R < k; then in equilibrium
PA(R) =  < PQ(R):
Thus informative voting is equilibrium only for specic aggregation rule(s).
By denition, full information aggregation occurs in informative voting equi-
librium. Note that the set of critical values KN is a function of the ideological
bias and may contain one or more elements depending on size of the legisla-
ture. Let kN = minfKN g and kN = maxfKN g denote smallest and largest
rules that allow informative voting. If R > k; (in equilibrium,) voters with A
signal will vote A with probability 1 but voters with Q signal will randomize
and vote Q with probability  2 (0; 1): Since the threshold is relatively high,
voters tend to favor towards A. Similarly if R < k; voters with Q signal will
vote Q with probability 1 but voters with A signal will randomize and vote A
with probability  2 (0; 1): Equilibrium beliefs are consistent with actions and
randomizing types are indi¤erent: (Action probabilities  and  are derived
from equilibrium beliefs )
So when R =2 KN ; voters neglect some of their private information and the
resulting equilibrium is ine¢ cient.
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4.1 Two Round Voting in Legislature
Now suppose the homogenous legislature is voting in two rounds. If the pro-
posed law doesnt pass in the rst round, it is abolished. If it passes, then the
legislature votes again in the second round after observing the realized tally
after the rst round. Outcome in the second round determines the destiny of
the proposal. If R  kN ; there exists an equilibrium where legislature mem-
bers vote informatively in the rst round, and based on the realized tally, cast
their votes in the second round. Because all signals are revealed in the rst
round, full information aggregation is achieved.
Proposition 2 In the two round voting model of homogenous legislature with-
out a president, if R  kN ; there exists an equilibrium in which all members
of the legislature vote informatively in the rst round. If R > k
N
 ; then there
is no equilibrium in which the legislature votes informatively in either rst or
second round.
To get the intuition, when R  kN ; the threshold does not constitute a real
hurdle against informative voting in the rst round because decision will be -
nalized in the next round. Since there is no conict of interest among members,
everyone has an incentive to vote informatively in the rst round to increase
informational e¢ ciency. Thus adding second round provides full information
aggregation also for R < k
N
 . This mechanism does not work however when
R > k
N
 . The threshold is relatively high and prevents members from vot-
ing informatively in the rst round. Full information equivalence cannot be
achieved in this case.
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The next proposition describes the strategy of the legislature members in the
second round. Notice that the second round is reached only if the tally t in
the rst round is greater than or equal to R:
Proposition 3 Suppose the legislature is voting in two rounds without the
president and R  kN : If the realized tally in the rst round is t  kN ; then all
legislature members will vote A in the second round. If R  t  kN  1 then all
legislature members will vote Q in the second round. If t 2 (maxfR; kN g; kN  
1) then legislature members will also vote informatively in the second round
and the realized tally will not change. Whether t  R or t < R will dtermine
the legislation.
Proposition 4 Suppose the legislature is voting in two rounds without the
president. If R > k
N
 and the proposed law passes the rst round then all
members will vote A in the second round and the law will be enacted with
unanimity.
5 Main Results
After the preliminary analysis with legislature on its own, we are ready to
introduce the president. First, consider the case where the legislature is ho-
mogenous and the president has the same ideological bias with the legislature.
That is there is no conict and all players have the same threshold of reason-
able doubt l = p = .
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5.1 Single round legislation
Let k be as dened before for a homogenous autonomous legislature without
a president. Because theinterests of the president and the legislature are per-
fectly aligned, the actual threshold does not constitute a real barrier against
informative voting in legislature as long as R < kN . Legislature members
already have an incentive to vote informatively when R 2 (kN ; kN ): Then if
R  kN ; there exists an equilibrium in which legislature members vote infor-
matively and the president decides on behalf of all players condition on the
realized tally t and his own signal p. In particular, the president will approve
if Prf! = Qjt; pg < :
Proposition 5 If R  kN and all players have the same ideological bias, then
in single round legislation there exists an equilibrium in which all legislature
members vote informatively. If the realized tally is t, then the president hav-
ing Q signal will approve the proposal if t  kN+1 and veto otherwise. The
president having A signal will approve if t  kN+1   1 and veto otherwise
Because all playerssignals are taken into account in decision, the resulting
equilibrium fully aggregates information. Recall that in single round legisla-
tion without president, informative voting is equilibrium only if R 2 KN so
thanks to the existence of the president, informative voting and e¢ ciency are
also achieved when R < kN : However when R > k
N
 there is no equilibrium in
which the legislature votes informatively. In the most informative equilibrium,
strategy of a legislature member is the same as his strategy in single round
legislation without president (as described by Remark 1). The president al-
ways approves the law (even when he has Q signal) if the proposal passes the
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legislature.
Proposition 6 If R > kN and all players have the same ideological bias,
then in single round legislation the most informative equilibrium is legislature
members vote A if they have A signal, and vote Q with probability R 2 (0; 1)
if they have Q signal. They randomize with (R; 1 R) so that PA(R) <  =
PQ(R): In equilibrium, the president, regardless of his signal, always approves
and enacts the law once it passes the legislature.
This means the existence of the president is not su¢ cient for informative
voting and the equilibrium is ine¢ cient. Moreover the presidents signal has
no value in terms of information aggregation because the president neglects
his own signal.
5.2 Two round legislation
The analysis and the equilibria are somehow analogous to single round legisla-
tion with president. When R  kN ; then there exists an equilibrium in which
legislature members vote informatively in the rst round. But for R > k
N
 ;
informative voting of legislature is never realized in equilibrium. The presi-
dent takes an action based on the realized tally t and his own signal p. For
both ranges of R; his strategy is exactly the same as single round legislation
with corresponding R; examined above. If R > k
N
 ; second round is never
reached in equilibrium. When R  kN ; a legislature members second round
vote depends on the realized tally t in the rst round.
Proposition 7 In two round legislation with president , if R  kN and all
players have the same ideological bias, then there exists an equilibrium in which
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all legislature members vote informatively in the rst round. If the realized tally
is t, then the president having Q signal will approve the proposal if t  kN+1
and veto otherwise. The president having A signal will approve if t  kN+1  1
and veto otherwise. In the case of presidents veto:
If R < kN+1 and the realized tally t in the rst round is t 2 (R; kN+1   1)
then all legislature members will vote Q in the second round and the law will
be abolished.
For t 2 (maxfR; kN+1 g; kN+1  1) a legislative members strategy in the second
round is as specied by Proposition 1. The outcome will be determined by ex-
post realization of votes and signals.
Thus when R  kN ; the presidents action a¤ects the result of the legislation.
In equilibrium all legislature membersand the presidents signals are fully
utilized and full information aggregation is achieved in legislation. However
recall that the legislature already attains full informational equivalence by two
round voting without the president. Then in terms of e¢ ciency, the existence
of the president has benet of only one more additional signal.
But as the next proposition states, for R > k
N
 ; informative voting of legis-
lature is never realized in equilibrium. In the most informative equilibrium,
strategy of a legislature member in the rst round is the same of his strategy in
single round legislation without president. The president always approves the
law if the proposal passes the legislature. Therefore in two round legislation,
when R > k
N
 ; the president has no role in decision making and his signal has
no value for informational e¢ ciency.
Proposition 8 In two round legislation with president , if R > kN and all
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players have the same ideological bias, then there is no equilibrium in which all
legislature members vote informatively in either round. Legislature members
rst round strategy is as specied in Proposition 1. If the proposal passes the
legislature in the rst round, the president will always approve and enact the
law, regardless of his signal. Therefore in equilibrium second round is never
reached.
6 Ideological Heterogenoity
What will happen if the legislature and the president have di¤erent ideological
orientations? I rst examine the situation where the legislature is conservative
and the president is modernist. Next I examine modernist legislature with
conservative president. To model ideological heterogeneity, I introduce two
types: Conservative and modernist. c and m denote threshold of reasonable
doubt of conservative and modernist players, respectively. I assume and are not
very close to each other so that Kc and Km are disjoint. Therefore condition
on the same information set, if one type is voting informatively, the other type
is voting uninformatively.
When I introduced the persident in the last section, I initially assumed he has
the same ideology with the legislature. Next I examine the situations where
the ideological bias of the president is di¤erent from that of the legislature.
6.1 Conservative Legislature with a Modernist President
Consider the setting where all members of the legislature are conservative
and the president is modernist. (Let denote threshold of reasonable doubt of
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legislature member and the president, respectively.) Then L = c < P = m.
Observe that in single-round legislation the conservative legislature has the
rst-mover advantage over the president, because in the case of a conict i.e.
the legislature doesnt nd the law benecial enough while the president does,
then the legislature can abolish the law and nish the process in the rst place.
This argument characterizes the power balance in single-round legislation: in
the unique equilibrium, the legislature is fully decisive and legislature members
are voting as if there is no president.
Proposition 9 If the legislature members are conservative and the president
is modernist, then there exists a unique equilibrium in single round legislation
for all values of R. While casting his vote, a legislature member thinks as if
there is no president and conditions his vote on being pivotal on (R-1). If the
law passes the legislature, the president always approves it, regardless of his
own signal.
Intuitively if a conservative legislature passes a law, then the modernist pres-
ident is already willing to accept it. So the president always approves the law
even if he has Q signal. This suggests that the president has a no impact on
the outcome. The presidents private signal does not have any contribution
to information aggregation either since he completely ignores his own signal.
Full information aggregation is achieved only when R 2 KNc : Compared to au-
tonomous legislature voting single-round (Comparing single-round legislation
with and without president) suggests (implies) that the existence of a rela-
tively modernist president has no e¤ect on output or informational e¢ ciency
when the legislature is conservative.
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How do strategies and equilibria change in two-round legislation? As Propo-
sition 11 states, the equilibrium in two-round legislation is unique and anal-
ogous to equilibrium in single-round legislation. Legislature members in the
rst round condition on being pivotal on (R   1) and the president always
approves the law once it passes the legislature. The second round is never
reached in equilibrium. As in single-round legislation, the legislature is again
fully decisive on the outcome, but now the legislature members consider the
existence of the president while forming their strategies. Recall that in two
round legislation without the president, a homogenous legislature votes in-
formatively in the rst round when R  kNc. With the modernist president
however, informative voting is no longer achieved when R < kNc. To see why,
suppose R and the legislature is voting informatively in the rst round. It may
be the case that the realized tally is greater than or equal to R, but the tally
is low that the legislature prefers proposal not implemented but high enough
that the president prefers to be implemented. Since the proposed law passes
the legislature, the president would approve and enact it. Thus a legislature
member does not have an incentive to vote informatively when , meaning that
the existence of the president negatively a¤ects information aggregation. This
is the drawback of power struggle originating from ideological divergence.
Proposition 10 If the legislature members are conservative and the president
is modernist, there exists a unique equilibrium in two-round legislation for
all values of R. The rst round strategies of the legislature members and the
president are the same as corresponding ones in single-round legislation, stated
in Proposition 10. While casting his vote, a legislature member thinks as if
there is no president and conditions his vote on being pivotal on (R-1). If the
law passes the legislature, the president always approves it, regardless of his
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own signal.
Because the modernist president is ready to approve proposals that the legis-
lature is not convinced enough, the legislature members mainly consider rst
round voting rather than second round. Anticipating that legislation will be
nalized in the rst round, legislature members condition on being pivotal on
R-1 and they dont relegate their decision to the second round. Note that as
in the case of single-round legislation, the president does not have any real
role in decision making and his signal does not have any informational value.
Full information aggregation is achieved only when R 2 KNc .
6.2 Modernist Legislature with a Conservative President
A more exciting situation is the legislature consists of modernist members and
the president is conservative. That is There is a power struggle between the
legislature and the president, at the same time information signaling. Power
struggle arises in the case the modernist legislature members want the pro-
posal to be implemented but the conservative president rejects as he is not
convinced about the merits of the new law. Then in single-round legislation,
the conservative president is powerful since his veto abolishes the law. In two-
round legislation however, the legislature becomes more powerful since it can
always endorse and enact the law in the second round. Formal results conrm
this analysis.
In single-round legislation, the unique equilibrium is such that the legislature
is voting as if the aggregation rule is unanimity. The actual rule therefore
becomes irrelevant. If the proposal passes the legislature, the president ran-
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domizes between approving and vetoing the law. To understand the equilib-
rium strategies, suppose the legislature members condition on e¤ective rule
R(may be di¤erent from actual rule R) and R< N. If ex-post realization
of tally is low i.e. t=R, Rthen the presidents posterior belief will be . In
this situation the president will veto but the legislature wants the law to be
enacted. The fact that the realized tally is greater than or equal to R, weakly
impact inuences legislature members more toward A or doesnt change their
idea at all. Thus a legislature member would deviate and exaggerate A by
randomizing more toward A vote. This is equivalent to increasing the e¤ec-
tive aggregation rule to. However the president will update his posterior and
if realized tally is , conict of interest will still happen. Then the legislature
member will emphasize more and more toward A vote by increasing e¤ective
rule until it reaches upper limit N. Observe that the legislature member will
not exaggerate further by increasing e¤ective tally to N=1 or higher. This
would be compansated by a decrease the presidents approval probability, yet
increase the risk of approving poor laws. In single-round legislation legislature
members take into account both standard and signal pivotal motivations.
Proposition 11 In a setting where the legislature members are all modernist
and the president is conservative, then single-round legislation exhibits unique
equilibrium: A legislature member votes as if the legislature is autonomous
and the e¤ective aggregation rule is unanimity i.e. R = N . If the proposed
law passes the legislature, the president with a Q signal approves the law with
probability  2 (0; 1) and the president with an A signal approves the law with
probability  2 (0; 1) where  >  :
As the e¤ective tally becomes unanimity, legislature members tend to ne-
glect their signal more and the e¢ ciency of information aggregation decreases
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compared to the case without president. Thus the existence of the president
negatively e¤ects information aggregation. If this game were played with all
signals common knowledge, the president would collect all signals and ap-
prove only very benecial proposals, consistent with his ideology. Likewise the
legislature would eliminate really poor laws in the rst place. Thus in the orig-
inal game with private signals, the probability of enacting very poor laws and
eliminating very benecial laws is greater. The original legislation may yield
di¤erent outcome compared to the one with public signals so by denition full
information aggregation is never achieved.
6.2.1 Two-round legislation
In two-round legislation, the equilibrium depends on the range of R. In order
to better express the equilibria, I dene the trigger strategy for the president
as follows: When the president has Q signal, he vetoes with probability 1 and
when he has A signal, he approves with probability  2 (0; 1): As  becomes
closer to 1, presidents action becomes more informative and in the case of veto,
the legislature members attribute ex-post greater probability Prf! = Qjvetog
to president being Q type. So  measures the accuracy of the signal that
the president transmits and hence the degree of inuence of his veto on the
legislature in the second round. (Here  measures the accuracy of the signal
that the president transmits to the legislature in the second round.)
From the discussion in autonomous legislature voting two rounds, it is straight-
forward to see that when R  kNm; the aggregation rule is not a barrier to
informative voting, thanks to the existence of second round. As Proposition
13 illustrates, there exists an equilibrium in which the legislature members
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vote informatively in the rst round when R  kNm: The presidents action
may change the legislation outcome only when the realized tally in the rst
round is at the critical lower bound of informative voting t1 = k
N
m and the
parameters are such that one additional voter alters the informative voting
incentive at this lower bound . Then the president will transmit accurate
enough Q signal to the legislature by utilizing an appropriate trigger strategy
and law will be abolished if second round is reached. For all other situations
i.e. t1 = k
N
m = k
N+1
m or higher tally the presidents veto does not e¤ect legis-
lature membersactions in the second round so the president cannot change
the legislation outcome. In fact for high realizations of tally, depending on his
type the president will be convinced and always approves the law.
Proposition 12 Consider two round legislation where the legislative members
are modernist and the president is conservative. When R  kNm ; there exists
an equilibrium in which all legislature members vote informatively in the rst
round when R  kNm: If the realized tally is t1 = kNm and kN+1m = kNm+1 then
the president adopts trigger strategy where  is such that Prf! = Qj = A; t1 =
kNm ; vetog is just above m. However if t1 = kNm and kN+1m = kNm the president
will veto with probability 1. For all other tally values, the A type president will
approve when t1  kN+1c   1 and veto otherwise; Q type president will approve
when t1  kN+1c and veto otherwise. The legislature members second round
strategy is:
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si =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
vote Q, if t1 2 [R; kNm   1]
vote Q, if t1 = k
N
m and k
N+1
m = k
N
m + 1
when t1 = k
N
m and k
N+1
m = k
N
m vote informatively for R 2 KNm ; otherwise vote Q if i = Q; vote A with probability  2 (0; 1) satisfying PA(R) = m
when t1 2 [kNm + 1; k
N
m ]; vote informatively for R 2 KNm ; otherwise vote Q if i = Q; vote A with probability  2 (0; 1) satisfying PA(R) = m
when t1 > k
N
m ; vote A
Comparing the equilibria in two-round legislation with and without president,
I nd that the existence of the president matters only when t1 = k
N
m and
kN+1m = k
N
m + 1. Because the legislature already achieves informative voting
on its own in two-round legislation, the value of the presidents existence is
the amount of information he transmits to the legislature provided his action
a¤ects the outcome. Thus the president contributes less than one signal to
information aggregation. Note that as the next Remark states, full information
aggregation is generally attained in this setting. (The two exceptions are when
t1 = k
N
m = k
N+1
m and . In such situations, the probability that the legislation
concludes with A (or respectively Q) would be di¤erent if the game were played
with all playerssignals common knowledge.)
Remark 13 If the game were played with all playerssignals common knowl-
edge, the probability that the legislation concludes with A (or respectively Q)
would di¤er only for two possible cases: (i) the president has A signal, realized
tally t1 = k
N
m and K
N
m = K
N+1
m
is a singleton (ii) the president has A signal,
realized tally t1 = k
N
m and k
N+1
m = k
N
m + 1:
When the aggregation rule is R > k
N
m; the legislature member has to condi-
tion on R in the rst round and thus informative voting is no longer incentive
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compatible. In the most informative equilibrium, the legislature members rst
round strategy is the same as his strategy in single-round legislation with au-
tonomous legislature, as explained in Section . If the proposal passes the rst
round but the realized tally is low (in a low range),then the president will use
an appropriate trigger strategy to send Q signal to the legislature. The presi-
dent transmits just enough accuracy Q signal such that (transmitting) greater
accuracy Q signal would to make himself worse o¤ as it requires randomizing
more towards approving, but the accuracy of the transmitted Q signal is high
enough to ensure that ex-ante enough number of Q signal legislature members
vote Q in the second round to abolish the proposal. (The A type president will
randomize such that he transmits accurate enough Q signal to legislature to
ensure that ex-ante enough number of Q signal legislature members vote Q in
the second round to abolish the proposal. The president does not transmit so
high accuracy Q signal since doing so requires randomizing more towards ap-
proving which makes him worse o¤., but not so high to make president worse
o¤ because of randomizing more towards approving). Thus the president may
change the ex-post outcome in favor of himself if the second round is reached.
However when the realized tally in the rst round exceeds a critical level, the
legislature members will not consider the presidents action and all vote A
in the second round. So the president cannot change the legislation outcome
and he always vetoes in this case. (the president cannot change the legislation
outcome since legislature members will always vote A in the second round and
dont consider the presidents action. So the president always vetoes in this
case.) As the realized tally further increases, the president actually become
more and more convinced about the proposal and after some tally value he
always approve the proposed law. But note that these equilibrium strategies
heavily depend on parameters and the aggregation rule R. In particular if R
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is high, membersvotes are not so informative so even at the unanimous tally
(t=N), the president is not convinced and he does not always approve the law.
Proposition 14 Consider two round legislation where the legislative members
are modernist and the president is conservative. When R > k
N
m ; in the most
informative equilibrium, the rst round strategy of legislature members are the
same of their strategy in single round legislation with autonomous legislature
as illustrated in Proposition 1. If the realized tally is t1 2 [R;R1] for some
R1 2 [R;N ] then the president adopts trigger strategy with (t1): Depending
on parameters, there may be a higher range of realized tally t1 2 [R1+1; R2] for
which the president unconditionally vetoes. If so, there may exist, depending on
parameters, a further higher range of tally t1 2 [R2+1; R3] where the president
takes informative action and maybe another range of tally t1 2 [R3 + 1; N ] he
always approves the law. If second round is reached and t1 > R1; all members
will vote A in the second round. If t1 2 [R;R1]; ex-post realization of signals
and rst round votes will determine second round actions and the legislation
result.
The president may a¤ect the outcome (The president has a real role in de-
cision making) only when the proposed law passes the legislature in the rst
round and the realized tally is low enough t1 2 [R;R1]:Whether the president
actually changes the outcome depends on ex-post realization of legislature
memberssignals and the tally in the rst round. The presidents existence
has a value of less than one signal because he sends imperfect Q signal to
legislature when his action is inuential. Full information aggregation is never
achieved.
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7 General Case: Heterogenous Legislature with President
It would be natural to investigate more general cases where the legislature is
ideologically heterogeneous and the president has di¤erent ideological biases. I
consider two di¤erent ideological groups, conservatives and modernists in the
legislature and a president with any ideological bias, not necessarily one of the
types in the legislature.
Suppose there are Nc number of conservative members with  = c and Nm
number of modernist members with  = m in the legislature. I assume the ide-
ological bias of two types are not very close to each other that is . Modernists
are more powerful in the legislature if they can always pass the proposed law
in the legislature on their own, namely if they are winning coalition , on the
contrary conservatives are more powerful if they can always block the law i.e.
Observe that if modernists are not a winning coalition then conservatives are
more powerful, hence one group is always more powerful in the legislature. As
Proposition 15 states, this is crucial in characterizing equilibrium behavior.
In single round legislation, there is no equilibrium in which all members vote
informatively. Independent of the aggregation rule and the presidents ideol-
ogy, less powerful group in the legislature will always vote its bias and the
powerful group will vote as if it is decisive on the legislature with e¤ective ag-
gregation rule. Full information aggregation is never achieved since members
of one group do not reveal their private information.
Proposition 15 Consider a heterogeneous legislature with Nc conservative
and Nm = N  Nc modernist members. In single round legislation, regardless
of the presidents ideology and aggregation rule R,
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(i) If modernists are winning coalition (Nm  R), then conservatives will
always vote Q and modernists will act as if they are decisive in the legislature,
as in Proposition 1.
(ii) If conservatives are a blocking coalition /(Nc > N   R), then modernists
will always vote A and conservatives will act as if they are decisive in the
legislature with e¤ective aggregation rule R = R Nm
To see this result, there is no situation in which both types condition on being
pivotal on the same aggregation rule R and both take some level of informative
action; one type always votes its bias. Using similar logic, (I nd that) in two
round legislation, the less powerful group in the legislature always votes its
bias in the rst round. In the second round of legislation (when reached) if the
powerful group votes its bias or against its bias as a pure strategy then it is
decisive on the outcome. The only situation where the less powerful group may
a¤ect the result is when the dominant group is voting informatively or partially
informatively. But as suggested by Proposition 16, the less powerful group is
always voting its bias in this case. Then the powerful type adjusts (updates)
the e¤ective aggregation rule accordingly. Thus the powerful group is decisive
on the legislature in both rounds. Again as in single round legislation, full
information aggregation is never achieved.
Proposition 16 Consider two round legislation with a president and a het-
erogeneous legislature with Nc conservative and Nm = N Nc modernist mem-
bers. In equilibrium, in the rst round the less powerful group will always vote
its bias and the more powerful group will act as if it determines the legislature
outcome. single round legislation, regardless of the presidents ideology and
aggregation rule R,
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(i) If modernists are winning coalition (Nm  R), then in the rst round of
the game all conservatives vote Q and modernists act as if the legislature is
homogenous and consists of only themselves. In the second round (if reached)
when modernists are voting informatively or voting Q then conservatives vote
Q with probability 1. If modernists are voting A in the second round then
depending on the information set, conservatives strategy can be always vote
Q or always vote A or vote informatively or partially informatively. If in the
second round conservatives are voting A or voting informatively or partially
informatively then modernists must be voting A with probability 1.
(ii) If conservatives are a blocking coalition /(Nc > N   R), then in the rst
round of the game all modernists vote A and conservatives act as if the legis-
lature consists of only themselves and the aggregation rule (R   Nm): In the
second round (if reached) when conservatives are voting informatively or vot-
ing A then modernists vote A with probability 1. If conservatives are voting Q
in the second round then depending on the information set, modernistsstrat-
egy can be always vote A or always vote Q or vote informatively or partially
informatively. If in the second round modernists are voting Q or voting infor-
matively or partially informatively then conservatives must be voting Q with
probability 1. Conservatives take the e¤ective aggregation rule R = R Nm in
the second round too.
In light of Propositions 15 and 16, the less powerful group in the legislature
does not have a real role in decision making. Thus without loss of generality
we can solely consider the more powerful group in the legislature with e¤ective
aggregation rule. In other words, we can think of the legislature as homoge-
nous. Then depending on whether the president is more conservative or more
modernist or same ideology compared to the powerful group in the legislature,
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the problem reduces to one of the cases studied before.
8 Asymmetric Equilibrium
Throughout the paper, I have performed the analysis using symmetric equilib-
rium. In this section I briey investigate asymmetric equilibria of the single-
round and two-round legislation game. I dene asymmetric equilibrium as
legislature members with the same ideology do not necessarily use the same
strategy. Although other types of asymmetric equilibria exist, I concentrate
(focus) on a particular type of asymmetric equilibrium in which among the
same type, some players (one subgroup) vote informatively, only one player
votes partially informatively and all others vote uninformatively. I name (call)
this polarized asymmetric equilibrium. As Proposition 17 shows, given the true
state of nature polarized equilibrium yields greater likelihood of correct deci-
sion and lowest likelihood of wrong decision compared to all other asymmetric
equilibria. Note that for the same committee and aggregation rule, there may
be more than one polarized equilibrium. The most informationally e¢ cient
polarized equilibrium is the one in which greatest number of players voting
informatively.
Proposition 17 Consider single round legislation with an autonomous leg-
islature (there is no president). The legislature consists of N members all
having the same threshold of reasonable doubt  and the aggregation rule is
R. If R 2 KN , there is a trivial polarized equilibrium in which all members
vote informatively. If 9cN such that R 2 K bN and cN < N then there ex-
ists an asymmetric equilibrium (polarized equilibrium) in which cN number of
members (set I) vote informatively, N   cN   1 number of members uncon-
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ditionally vote Q and the remaining one member uses the following strategy:
He votes Q if he has Q signal and randomizes if he has A signal so that
PA(R) = Prfw = Qjt i = R   1; i = A; i 2 Ig is innitesimally less
than . If 9cN such that R 2 K bN and cN > N and there is a > 0 such
that (R   a) 2 KN a then in the polarized equilibrium (N   a) number of
members (set I) vote informatively, (a   1) number of members uncondi-
tionally vote A and the remaining one member uses the following strategy:
He votes A if he has A signal and randomizes if he has Q signal so that
PQ(R) = Prfw = Qjt i = R   1; i = Q; i 2 Ig is innitesimally larger than
.
Remark 18 For xed R and N, there is a polarized equilibrium corresponding
to each committee of particular size cN for which R is a critical rule for infor-
mative voting, namely R 2 K bN . Among these the polarized equilibrium with
greatest number of players voting informatively provides higher probability of
correct decision and lower probability of wrong decision making compared to
all other asymmetric equilibria.
In polarized asymmetric equilibrium, intuitively some players vote uncondi-
tionally one alternative to adjust the e¤ective aggregation rule so that other
players have incentive to vote informatively. And one player uses partial infor-
mative strategy to increase information e¢ ciency as much as possible without
breaking othersincentive. Now what asymmetric equilibria do single-round
and two-round legislation exhibit? First note that the symmetric pure strategy
equilibria are also a special type of asymmetric equilibria and polarized equilib-
ria. So any symmetric equilibrium of the single-round or two-round legislation
game in which legislature members are voting informatively and symmetric
equilibria in which they all vote Q or all vote A are also asymmetric equilibria
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of the legislation game. Proposition 19 shows that, in addition, there exists an
analogous polarized asymmetric equilibrium corresponding to each symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium of single-round or two-round game (legislation) in
the sense that the strategy of the president is identical (remains unchanged) in
both types of equilibria. Yet the ex-ante probability of making correct decision
in polarized asymmetric equilibria is always greater than symmetric (mixed
strategy) equilibria.
Proposition 19 Suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium of single-round or
two-round legislation where legislature members use mixed strategy in the rst
round (as stated in Proposition 1). Then for all ideological prole of players
there exists a polarized equilibrium of the game with the president using the
same strategy as in the symmetric equilibrium. However polarized equilibrium
yields ex-ante higher probability of correct decision and lower probability of
wrong decision. Moreover ex-post outcomes of the two equilibria may di¤er
even with the same realization of signals.
Therefore all symmetric equilibria of single-round or two-round legislation are
implemented (achievable) by asymmetric equilibria. There are however asym-
metric equilibria not implemented (achievable) by symmetric equilibrium. The
presidents strategy in such asymmetric equilibria are outside the scope of
symmetric equilibria. But as far as the most e¢ cient polarized equilibrium is
concerned, the set of asymmetric equilibria coincides with the most e¢ cient
symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 20 In single-round and two-round legislation, for all ideological
proles of the legislature and the president, the presidents strategy in the most
e¢ cient asymmetric equilibrium is the same as his strategy in the most e¢ -
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cient symmetric equilibrium. But even with the same realization of signals the
decision of the legislature may di¤er under analogous symmetric and asym-
metric equilibria unless the legislature members utilize the same (pure) strategy
in two types of equilibrium. Ex-post outcome of the legislation is assured to be
the same only if all playersstrategies under two equilibrium are the same and
all players use pure strategies.
Thus the set of e¢ cient asymmetric equilibria and e¢ cient symmetric equi-
libria are analogous to each other. Nevertheless ex-ante probability of correct
decision making in analogous symmetric and asymmetric equilibrium is the
same only when all legislature membersstrategies are identical. This is pos-
sible if all legislature members use pure strategy in all rounds of the game i.e.
informative or uninformative. Ex-post outcome of the legislation also depends
on the presidents action.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I have studied a model of single and two round legislation in par-
liamentary and semi-presidential democracies. I have analyzed informational
e¢ ciency and the role of the president in the legislation process. (Generally)
the president is more powerful in single-round voting than in two-round vot-
ing. The reverse is true (applies/happens) for the legislature. But even in
two-round voting the president is not totally powerless: There are instances
where the president can change the result of the legislation as in modernist
legislature with a conservative president and as in legislature and the president
same ideology. Power struggle occurs only when the legislature is modernist
and the president is conservative. In single-round legislation, the existence of
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conservative president signicantly decreases the likelihood of correct decision
making. However if legislation is two round, the president does not have a
negative e¤ect on information aggregation e¢ ciency. When the legislature is
conservative and the president is modernist, the president has no impact on
the outcome in single-round or two-round legislation. But in two-round leg-
islation his existence hinders (disturbs) full information aggregation because
legislature members would vote informatively for a range of R without the
president. If the legislature and the president have the same ideology, there is
no conict of interest and the presidential institution is benecial. Especially
in single-round legislation, for a range of R rules, the existence of president
provides full information aggregation for nite legislature size which the leg-
islature cannot achieve by itself.
In two-round legislation, (note that) with the appropriate R rule, the legisla-
ture already attains full information aggregation without the president. For
the same range of R rule, full informational e¢ ciency (equivalence) is still
attained in two-round legislation when the legislature and the president have
the same ideology or when the legislature is modernist and the president is
conservative. Thus in these settings the value of the presidents existence is
the amount of information he contributes to information aggregation which is
(in equilibrium) less than (at most) one signal.
The discussion above assumes a homogenous legislature but the results are
generalizable to heterogeneous legislature as well. Section shows that in the
case of heterogeneous legislature, the powerful group behaves as if the legis-
lature is composed of only themselves with an adapted aggregation rule . So
as far as equilibrium characteristics and the president are concerned, there is
no loss of generality in assuming a homogenous legislature. However hetero-
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geneous legislature never achieves full informational e¢ ciency since votes of
the less powerful group members never a¤ect the legislation process and their
private information (of less powerful group) are not utilized in the decision.
For all ideological proles and aggregation rules R, the probability of the pres-
idents approval and the likelihood of the legislature passing the proposal in
the second round (if reached) are both weakly increasing in the tally of votes
(in favor of the proposal) in the rst round. This is an evidence for the sig-
naling phenomenon. Realized tally in the legislature is a relevant information
for the president and the legislature members themselves in second round
voting (when applicable). Notice however that the legislature members must
also condition on the aggregation rule hence they also have standard-pivotal
motives. These points are parallel to Iaryczower (2008) that studies voting
and signaling in sequential committees. My single-round legislation model is
a special case of Iaryczower (2008) where the receiving committee consists of
single member. However in Iaryczower (2008) committees are heterogeneous
and not ideologically polarized. Thus he doesnt investigate alternative ideo-
logical proles of two committees and strategic interaction among them (as in
this paper). Rather he classies voting equilibria and gives conditions for in-
formative voting in both committees. Moreover he examines only single-round
voting. As I demonstrate equilibria of single-round legislation for various ideo-
logical proles of two sequential units (actors), I conjecture that the qualitative
description of these equilibria will continue to hold for equivalent ideological
proles of two sequential homogenous committees.
I hope my analysis is helpful to understand power balance between institu-
tions and information transmission in the real legislative processes of parlia-
mentary and semi-presidential democracies. The ndings regarding the pres-
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idents equilibrium action (veto or approval) and whether second round is
reached in two-round legislation constitute testable hypothesis for empirical
data on legislation as well as experimental economics. Another potential ex-
tension is optimal mechanism to reveal and utilize private information of all
players to maximize likelihood of correct decision making. I leave these two
promising topics for future research.
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